“They [the European left] show solidarity with our defeats,
but they cannot stand our victories.” Gabriel García Márquez
“Questions that are essential for any strategy for power,
such as the nature of power itself, the state, strategies, alliances, the
development of alternative blocs of forces, imperialism, foreign alliances,
analyses of the balance of forces, the building of support, the development of
a hegemonic bloc, and others were either set aside or disappeared altogether.
This was especially the case insofar as the social movements came to play the
leading role in anti neoliberal struggles. The passage from defensive struggles
to a dispute over hegemony has to mean – as it does in the texts of the Comuna
group or in the speeches of Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa – a return to these
questions, updating them for the period of neoliberal hegemony and the struggle
against the tyranny of markets. Relying on mere denunciation with no commitment
to formulate and develop particular political alternatives, tends to distance
much of the intelligentsia from the concrete historical processes faced by the
popular movements in the region. These in term are condemned to endless
processes of trial and error, because they do not have the support of a body of
theory committed to the processes of change that really exist.
The opposite temptation is a strong one. Since Fidel Castro
is not Lenin, Che is not Trotsky, Hugo Chávez is not Mao Zedong, Evo Morales is
not Ho Chi Minh and Rafael Correa is not Gramsci, it might seem easier to
reject the processes that really exist, because they do not correspond to the
dreams of revolution cast in the image of another era, than to try understand contemporary
history as it is, with all its enigmas. In other words, either we recognize the
signs left by the new Latin American mole, or we resign ourselves to the
anthologies to which classic texts have been reduced to the nervous and
sectarian hands of those who are afraid of history.
Taking refuge in classic texts is the most comfortable path
but also the surest route to failure. Defeats are usually attributed not to
political causes but to moral ones. ‘Betrayal’ is the most common. The
inability to give political explanations leads to sub-political, moral
accounts….
The defence of principles supposedly contained in those
classic texts seems to explain everything, except the most important thing: why
is it that doctrinaire, extremist views of the ultra-left never triumph, never
manage to convince the majority of the population, never build organizations
capable of leading the revolutionary processes? They identify with the great
balance sheet of defeats, but never to the growth of revolutionary political
forces…Those who only appear in public to criticize others on the left, often
taking advantage of spaces in the right-wing media, have lost sight of who the
main enemies are, and of the central confrontation with the right.
The challenge is to face the contradictions of history as it
really exists, in the concrete conditions of Latin America
today, and to tease out the elements with which to build a post neoliberal
order. The Comuna group were able to do this because they reread Bolivia’s
history, particularly since the 1952 Revolution; deciphered its significance,
identified the country’s subsequent historical periods, understood the cycles
that led to the decline of neoliberalism, managed to avoid the mistakes of the
traditional left in relation to historical subjects, and did the indispensible
theoretical work needed to marry Evo Morales’s leadership with the re-emergence
of the indigenous movement as the essential protagonist of the current period
of Bolivian history. In this way they were able to re-establish the link
between theoretical and political practice and help the new popular movement to
carry their economic and social demands into the ethnic and political arenas.
Such theoretical work is indispensible and can only be done
on the basis of the concrete reality of each country, combined with reflection
on the historical experiences and theories acquired by the popular movement
over the years. Reality has no mercy on theoretical errors. Latin
America in the twenty-first century needs and deserves a theory
that is up to the challenges of the time.”
The vast majority of left-wing (liberal, social democratic, communist, anarchist), repeat on the level of politics (with praxis taking the place of production), the problems of left-wing literary hacks polemicised against by Brecht, "production makes them uncomfortable. You never know where you are with production; production is the unforseeable. You never know what's going to come out. And they themselves don't want to produce. They want to play the apparatchik and exercise control over other people. Every one of their criticisms contains a threat."
Žižek’s defence of Chávez merely reverses the judgement
entailed by this ahistorical, idealist (whether invoking liberal, social
democratic, communist or anarchist principles) critique. The categories of the
classical texts now support rather than indict Chávez but it is still the
classical texts that guide interpretation. To put it another way, no effort is
made to understand contemporary history in all its enigmas, Chávez is supported
because, apparently, he did “correspond to the dreams of revolution cast in the
image of another [Leninist] era.”
As with Graeber’s (and the stench of snobbery here is utterly overwhelming) reply to Žižek, “Why is Chávez the model? Why not, say, Evo Morales,
who, unlike Chávez, really was placed in power by, and remains answerable to,
genuine social movements? Could we imagine Žižek, even in his fantasies,
patiently listening to the demands of the directly democratic assemblies of El
Alto? Chávez may be a virtuoso performer but he is also a political comedian
holding power with no real responsibility except to give his audience pleasure”
and Critchley’s particularly repulsive taking up of this line of
argument, Bolivia and
Morales are often invoked against Venezuela and Chávez. The
invocation of Morales remains, in the last instance, an idealist critique (as any appeal to one abstract model of how politics should be done is bound to be), the
concrete realities and historical differences between Bolivia and Venezuela are ignored. No attention
is paid to Bolivia’s
class and ethnic composition, the significance of the 1952-3 revolution and the
defeats of the Trade Union movement in
the 1980s- the lesson that the revolution could not be constructed around a
workers and peasants’ alliance as in the Bolshevik Revolution. Similarly,
Graeber and Critchley pay no attention to the theoretical work done by Comuna,
as Sader writes, “it was the specific, concrete reconstruction of Bolivian
history, beginning in the pre-colonial period that allowed García Linera to
grasp the decisive elements of the native people’s identity, of their
indigenous condition – more specifically their condition as Aymara, Quechua or
Guaraní. It was this kind of analysis that made it possible to grasp the
identity of the indigenous people as a whole, that allowed them to assume this
identity politically and elect Evo Morales as president, as well as build a
party – the MAS – as a vehicle to establish their hegemony over Bolivian
society as a whole.” (Sader, p. 107) Finally, and most importantly, they pay no
attention to the popular uprisings from 2000-5 that not only led to Morales’s
electoral victory in 2005 but entailed, (García Linera) the “growing
incorporation of broader social sectors into political decision making (water,
land, gas, Constituent Assembly) through their union, communal, neighbourhood
or guild organizations; there has been a continual weakening of governmental
authority and fragmentation of state sovereignty”.
With Venezuela lacking these conditions
in 1998, to condemn Chávez for not being Morales is merely idealist. Evaluating
Chávez from the left, our task is to strip away these sub-political critiques
and instead explore the achievements and limitations
of Chavismo, paying attention to the specific conditions of Venezuela and the impact of imperialism. There are three main sets
of questions for the left critique of Chávez.
Firstly, could the left have come to power in Venezuela (not Bolivia,
not Ecuador, not Brazil, not Spain
in the 1930s or Russia
in 1917) without a figure like Chavez to mobilize around? Secondly, could the concrete achievements of
Chavismo particularly in poverty reduction and the construction of ALBA as a
model for international trade based on solidarity rather than charity or
neoliberalism have been achieved without this taking of state power and, if so,
how? If not why are you prepared to sacrifice them? Finally, how far were the
distortions within the Venezuelan political project attributable to how had to
win and exercise power taking power? Or, perhaps better, given the necessity of
taking power in this way and the very real possibility of Chávez being bloodily
overthrown, not an abstract possibility given the failed coup of 2002, would it have been possible to go beyond a national-popular reformism which
retained the support of some sectors of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie towards
something more radical and beyond the forms of power exercised by Chavez
personally? Chávez seems to have learnt three lessons from Allende that are pertinent. The first, from the left of the necessity of obvious, popular improvements to the everyday life of the poor; Allende, despite everything, was insufficiently popular with the Chilean working class. The second from the right, Allende unnecessarily offended powerful sections of national bourgeoisie. Both these failings were compounded by Allende winning the election on 36% of the popular vote. Thirdly, from the perspective of authority, Allende failed to take control of the army and disarmed the workers' militias of Santiago and Valparaiso. Chávez, elected always with a substantial majority of the popular vote, learnt the lessons of these three mistakes from Allende, small-scale but significant and popular improvements to the everyday life of the poor were achieved without a radical break with existing economic relations or with the form of the state.
It strikes me that the answer to the first question is
almost definitely no, to the second no, and the answer to the final set of
questions, possibly but with some difficulty and at considerable risk not just for Chávez personally or the political process but, given what happened in Chile after the overthrow of Allende, or, more recently, in Haiti after the Franco-American instigated overthrow of Aristide, for the thousands of left-wing militants and ordinary poor people. The
point is not so much the answers themselves but that any left attempt to reckon
with Chávez confronts the actual situation and does not proceed through wishful
thinking, a fetish for heroic defeat or preserving the classic texts of anarchism
or Marxist-Leninism in idealist uselessness.